Comprehenders' perception of the world is mediated by the mental models they construct. During discourse processing, incoming information allows comprehenders to update their model of the events being described. At the same time, comprehenders use these models to generate expectations about who or what will be mentioned next. The temporal dynamics of this interdependence between language processing and mental event representation has been difficult to disentangle. The present visual world eye-tracking experiment measures listeners' coreference expectations during an intersentential pause between a sentence about a transfer-of-possession event and a continuation mentioning either its Source or Goal. We found a temporally dispersed but sustained preference for fixating the Goal that was significantly greater when the event was described as completed rather than incomplete (passed versus was passing). This aligns with reported offline sensitivity to event structure, as conveyed via verb aspect, and provides new evidence that our mental model of an event leads to early and, crucially, proactive expectations about subsequent mention in the upcoming discourse.
Introduction
When we process discourse, we create mental models of the events being described (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) . We use incoming linguistic information, together with our knowledge of the world, to incrementally update these models as the discourse progresses. Subtle differences in linguistic choices can have measurable effects on our mental representations of a situation. For example, events described with imperfective-marked verbs (e.g., Leah was passing the salt to Eve) are construed as ongoing, with attention distributed across event participants, whereas perfective aspect (Leah passed the salt to Eve) evokes an event as completed, bringing participants associated with its end state into the focus of attention (Madden & Ferretti, 2009; Magliano & Schleich, 2000; Moens & Steedman, 1988) . In the domain of reference processing, this focus of attention on an event participant is linked to the probability of that participant being rementioned in the next sentence. An ambiguous pronoun following a perfective-marked transferof-possession event (e.g., Leah passed the salt to Eve. She…) is preferentially interpreted as referring to the Goal of the transfer event (Eve), who is now in possession of the transferred object, rather than the Source (Leah; Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994) . Importantly, when the verb is marked with imperfective (was passing), this Goal preference decreases (Kehler, Kertz, Rohde, & Elman, 2008; Rohde, Kehler, & Elman, 2006) , consistent with more equal focus on participants in a mental model of an ongoing event.
In this paper we investigate this interdependence between language processing and our mental representations of events, probing the timecourse over which our situation models inform our processing of reference. This question has been addressed extensively for events and situations described with Implicit Causality verbs (IC; Garvey & Caramazza, 1974; Hartshorne, 2014) , where a long-standing debate centers on whether these referential biases emerge before, at, or after a pronoun in contexts involving inferences about the event's cause (see Koornneef, Dotlačil, van den Broek, & Sanders, 2016, for review).
1 One possibility is that these biases depend on the referential expression, such that a pronoun prompts comprehenders to consult their current situation model, and the distribution of attention to event participants in that model influences their referential choices. This could explain findings from story continuation experiments in which manipulations of IC status or grammatical aspect influenced participants' referential choices when they wrote completions for sentences starting with an ambiguous pronoun (Kehler et al., 2008 
